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On April 5 2016, an important event in the history of artificial intelligence (AI) took place. A 
group of museums and research institutions in the Netherlands, in conjunction with Microsoft, 
unveiled a portrait entitled “The Next Rembrandt”.1 This is not a newly found painting by 
Rembrandt Harmenszoon van Rijn, nor it is an imitation as such. What makes this portrait 
unique is that it is presented as a new painting that could have been created by Rembrandt, as 
it was generated by a computer after painstakingly analysing hundreds of artworks by the Dutch 
Golden Age artist. The machine used something called “machine learning”2 to analyse 
technical and aesthetic elements in Rembrandt’s works, including lighting, colouration, 
brushstrokes, and geometric patterns. The result is a painting where algorithms have produced 
a portrait based on the styles and motifs found in Rembrandt’s art.  
One could argue the artistic value of this endeavour,3 but the technical achievement is ground-
breaking. The researchers took in every Rembrandt painting pixel by pixel, and most of the 
decisions of what would make the final painting were made by the machine itself using pre-
determined algorithms. In other words, this represents a computer’s interpretation of what a 
typical Rembrandt painting should look like. 
It may seem like this is just another technical advance in a long line of computer-generated art, 
but what is really happening under the hood of artistic projects such as The Next Rembrandt 
displays a quantum leap in the way that we use machines. We are getting to the point at which 
vital creative decisions are not made by humans, rather they are the expression of a computer 
learning by itself based on a set of parameters pre-determined by programmers.  
It is fair to point out that The Next Rembrandt has not been the subject of any legal scrutiny as 
of yet. As far as we can tell, the programming team has not made any copyright claims over 
the painting; it is a project created as an advertisement of the technological capacities that gave 
rise to it, as it is funded and supported by commercial sponsors. Rembrandt’s paintings are in 
the public domain, and there is likely not going to be any legal opposition to the project, or we 
are not likely to see this as a violation of moral rights. We are neither likely to revisit questions 
of originality in the copies of public domain works that were explored in Bridegman v Corel.4 
However, the project raises other interesting legal questions. Does this painting have copyright 
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on its own right? If so, who owns it? If this project was based on the works of a living artist, 
could he or she object to the treatment in some manner? Would it be copyright infringement?  
This article will try to look at the first questions, namely the issue of whether computer-
generated works have copyright protection. While the law about this type of creative work is 
answered satisfactorily in the UK, the treatment of such works is less clear in other 
jurisdictions, and there is still debate as to whether some computer works even have copyright 
in the first place. This article will make a comparative analysis of the law in the UK, Europe, 
Australia and the US. This is becoming an important area of copyright, and one that has not 
been explored in depth in the literature.   
2. Artificial intelligence and the law 
2.1 Artificial Intelligence and machine learning 
When we hear the term “artificial intelligence”, it is easy to think of it as a futuristic topic, and 
often the first image that comes to mind one of science fiction depictions of AI, either the 
human-like friendly android, or the killer robot. But if we understand artificial intelligence as 
“the study of agents that exist in an environment and perceive and act”,5 it is possible to 
appreciate that this is a much broader area of study, and we already have various applications 
used in everyday life that meet the threshold of what is artificial intelligence. From search 
engine algorithms to predictive text in mobile phones, we are constantly interacting with AI.  
Of particular interest to the present article is the application of artificial intelligence in creative 
works such as art, computer games, film, and literature. There is a short but vibrant history of 
computer-generated art that takes advantage of different variations of AI algorithms to produce 
a work of art. The first military-grade computers were able to produce crude works of art, but 
these first efforts relied heavily on the input of the programmer.6 During the 1970s, a new 
generation of programs that were more autonomous started making an appearance, with 
AARON, a project by artist Harold Cohen becoming one of the longest-running examples of 
the genre.7 Later projects, such as e-David, made use of robot arms with real canvas and real 
colouring palettes.8 The techniques used in some of these “computer artists” vary from project 
to project, and while the aspiration of many of these is to be “taken seriously […] as a creative 
artist”,9 most projects work either copying existing pictures, or almost directly guided by their 
programmers.  
In the textual realm, renowned futurist Ray Kurzweil was granted a patent in the United States 
for “poet personalities”,10 protecting a method of generating an artificial poet capable of 
reading a poetry work, analysing the structure, and coming up with its own outputs. Kurzweil 
went to design a poet called Ray Kurzweil's Cybernetic Poet (RKCP), which reads an extensive 
selection of poems from an author, and then uses a type of neural network algorithm to produce 
recursive poetry that can “achieve the language style, rhythm patterns, and poem structure of 
the original authors”.11 The RKCP programme produced a series of poems, the quality of which 
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is debatable. However, this resulting haiku may prove evocative regarding the subject matter 
of the current article:  
“The stifling stuffy 
Catholic schoolroom, 
where I cannot be real.”12 
While interesting from an artistic and technical perspective, all of the above examples of 
computer art and literature rely heavily on the programmer’s input and creativity. But the next 
generation of artificial intelligence artists are based on entirely different advances that make 
the machine act more independently, sometimes even making autonomous creative decisions. 
The field of machine learning is a subset of artificial intelligence that studies autonomous 
systems that are capable of learning without being specifically programmed.13 The computer 
programme has a built-in algorithm that allows it to learn from data input, evolving and making 
future decisions in ways that can be either directed, or independent.14 There are various 
techniques that fall under the category of machine learning,15 but for the purpose of this article, 
we will concentrate on those which show potential for creative works.  
One of the most exciting innovations in machine learning art comes in the shape of what is 
known as an artificial neural network, an artificial intelligence approach based on biological 
neural networks that use neuron equivalents based on mathematical models.16 One such 
application in art is a Google project called Deep Dream,17 a visualization tool that uses neural 
networks to create unique, bizarre, and sometimes unsettling images.18 Deep Dream transforms 
a pre-existing image using machine learning mathematical methods that resemble biological 
neural networks, in other words, the machine mimics human thinking and makes a decision as 
to how to transform the input based on pre-determined algorithm. What is novel about Deep 
Dream, and other similar applications of neural networks, is that the program decides what to 
amplify in the image modification, so the result is unpredictable, but also it is a direct result of 
a decision made by the algorithm. The researchers explain: 
“Instead of exactly prescribing which feature we want the network to 
amplify, we can also let the network make that decision. In this case we 
simply feed the network an arbitrary image or photo and let the network 
analyze the picture. We then pick a layer and ask the network to enhance 
whatever it detected. Each layer of the network deals with features at a 
different level of abstraction, so the complexity of features we generate 
depends on which layer we choose to enhance.”19 
The result of different levels of abstraction produce new images that do not resemble the 
originals, but most importantly, they are not the result of creative decisions by the 
programmers, but rather they are produced by the program itself.  
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Deep Mind, the Google company dedicated to the exploration of machine learning, has been 
publishing large number of papers explaining the various experiences with artificial agents 
engaged in the development of art and music.20 While Deep Dream has been widely publicised 
in the mainstream media, one of the most astounding projects involves music, and it is called 
WaveNet.21 This is a project that was initially created to generate seamless artificial voice audio 
by using a machine learning algorithm that replicates how voices sound in real life, which tries 
to get past the mechanical sound when computers speak. What is interesting is that by analysing 
voice waves, Wavenet has learned also how to create music. When given a set of classical 
music to analyse, Wavenet produced completely generative piano compositions that would not 
be amiss in a sophisticated piano concerto, and that has been generated solely by the machine.22 
The technology is reaching a point where it might be difficult to tell a real composer from an 
automated agent.  
Another relevant application of machine learning algorithms can be found in game 
development. There are already considerable applications of artificial intelligence in gaming,23 
but one of the most innovative is what is known as procedural generation, a method of creating 
content algorithmically.24 The promise of this type of development is to have gaming 
environments created not by the programmers, but that the program itself based on pre-
determined rules and algorithms. The potential is to have games with no end, where content is 
generated by the computer in a unique manner each time that the player logs in. This is already 
a reality in the blockbuster game No Man’s Sky, where the program makes “mathematical rules 
that will determine the age and arrangement of virtual stars, the clustering of asteroid belts and 
moons and planets, the physics of gravity, the arc of orbits, the density and composition of 
atmospheres”.25 While the programmers set parameters, the machine literally builds new 
virtual worlds every time it runs.  
We are about to encounter more and more artistic implementations of artificial intelligence 
using various machine learning methods, and examples already abound, including music,26 
movie scripts,27 and art installations.28 The common thread running through all of these 
applications is that most of the creative choices are no longer made programmers, and a large 
part of what we generally would define as the creative spark comes from the machine.     
2.2. Framing the issue of machine learning and copyright  
In the past few decades there has been growing interest in the legal applications of artificial 
intelligence. For the most part, the literature covers the use of artificial intelligence in legal 
systems as an aid to decision making,29 but there has been growing interest of the practical 
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implications of the wider availability and implementation of intelligent systems in everyday 
life.30 Machine learning itself has also started getting some attention in legal informatics as a 
method to index legal cases,31 and also to make legal arguments based on data inputs.32 Some 
algorithms are also drafting patent applications,33 and even have been used to pre-empt state of 
the art in future inventions.34  
All of these are often ground-breaking and innovative areas of research, but they tend to be a 
very specialist area of study that generally eludes the mainstream. Even the most popular works 
that propose some form of legal adoption of artificial intelligence in the legal profession35 can 
often be received with mild scepticism about the true reach of the potential for change.36  
But an aspect of machine learning has been generally neglected, with a few notable exceptions 
cited throughout this work, and it is that it may prompt us to revisit the concepts of originality 
and creativity that rest at the heart of copyright protection. There is a common element in most 
of the examples of machine learning that have been described in the previous section, and it is 
that we have machines that are starting to generate truly creative works, prompting us to review 
our understanding of originality.   
Intellectual property is specifically directed towards the protection of the fruits of the human 
mind, and these works are given a set of limited ownership rights allocated to persons, both 
natural and legal.37 Because of the personal nature of this type of protection, there is no such 
thing as non-human intellectual property rights.  
Copyright law clearly defines the author of a work as “the person who created it”.38 Despite 
some recent legal disputes regarding monkeys and photographs,39 it is highly unlikely that we 
will witness any deviation away from personhood as a requirement for ownership, and we are 
not to witness any sort of allocation of rights towards machines and animals. However, works 
like The Next Rembrandt could challenge what we generally consider to be original, which is 
one of the requirements for copyright protection.40 Is the mechanistic data analysis of dozens 
of portraits enough to warrant protection? Is there originality in the composition of the 
program? What if most of the creative decisions are being performed by the machine?  
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Interestingly, science fiction depiction of artificial intelligence organisms invariably tries to 
tackle the question of art and the machine. In various depictions of robots and androids, the 
understanding of art and music is an important element towards the elevation of the machine 
towards personhood. A great example of this is Data in Star Trek: The Next Generation, who 
struggles with his search for personhood by painting and performing music. On the other hand, 
the android Ava in the movie Ex Machina uses art to deceive one of the protagonists into 
thinking that it is more like a human, eventually betraying their trust. Art, music, and literature 
are quintessentially human, and any effort to allocate creativity to artificial intelligence feels 
wrong.  
But the fact remains that machines are creating art, even if the experts are divided in artistic 
merit of existing productions.41 While accepting that it is art, critic Ben Davies comments that 
Deep Dream “is essentially like a psychedelic Instagram filter”.42 So at the very least, we need 
to explore from a legal perspective if the new forms of creative works generated by intelligent 
machines meet the requirements for copyright protection, and if they do, we need to ask who 
owns the images.  
This may seem like a fruitless academic exercise with little practical implications, but there is 
potential for this becoming an important legal issue. Commercial application of machine 
learning is already taking place at a broader scale,43 and this technology is set to become an 
important tool in many creative industries in the future.44 A report by Nesta on the potential 
impact of artificial intelligence in the creative industries found that while highly creative jobs 
are not at risk, there will be a growing participation of machine learning in the industry. The 
report states: 
“In the creative economy, advances in the area of Mobile Robotics may have 
implications for making and craft activities (as industrial robots with 
machine vision and high–precision dexterity become cheaper and cheaper). 
Data Mining and Computational Statistics where algorithms are developed 
which allow cognitive tasks to be automated – or become data–driven – may 
conceivably have significant implications for non–routine tasks in jobs as 
wide–ranging as content.”45  
This means that while we still have writers, musicians, artists and game designers in charge of 
the creative process, large number of tasks, particularly mechanical tasks, might be given to 
machines.  
This is not science fiction, there are already plenty of examples of commercially-viable 
artificial intelligence projects that produce copyright works that sound indistinguishable from 
those produced by a human. Jukedeck46 is an interesting example that produces unique music 
for commercial use in seconds; the user only needs to specify the genre, the mood, and the 
length of the song, and the site’s neural network will produce a royalty-free composition that 
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can be incorporated into a video or any other derivative work.47 Similarly, a Google project 
used neural networks to produce unsupervised poetry after “reading” 11,000 unpublished 
books.48 In a related note, a news organisation has announced that it might deploy a machine 
learning algorithm to author news items in sport and election coverage.49  
The issue with examples such as these is that we are entering a new era of creation that allows 
for increasingly smart programs to produce advanced works that would normally be given 
copyright protection by the author. Boyden calls these creations “emergent works”, and 
comments that in many instances we are presented with pieces that have emerged from the 
program itself, and practically without human interaction.50  Will developments such as these 
have an effect in ownership? And what happens when machines start making important 
creative decisions?  
Finally, there is another angle to study, and this is the problem of artificial intelligence agents 
as copyright infringers.51 While extremely relevant in its own right, this topic falls outside of 
the remit of the current work, as it deals with the issue of responsibility of autonomous 
machines, rather than rights allocated to the creations that they produce.   
3. Protection of computer-generated works 
3.1 Computer-generated works in the UK 
The legal ownership of computer-generated works is perhaps deceptively straightforward in 
the UK. Section 9(3) of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act (CDPA) states:  
“In the case of a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work which is 
computer-generated, the author shall be taken to be the person by whom the 
arrangements necessary for the creation of the work are undertaken.” 
Furthermore, s 178 defines a computer-generated work as one that “is generated by computer 
in circumstances such that there is no human author of the work.” This is an elegant and concise 
wording that does away with most potential debates about the creative works produced by 
artificial intelligent agents. However, the UK is one of only a few countries protect computer-
generated works,52 most of the others clearly inspired by the UK treatment of computer-
generated works, as they use practically the same formulation.53 In fact, this has been for a 
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while considered one of the most salient aspects where UK and Irish copyright law diverges 
from the European norms,54 as will be explained in the next section.   
The fact that s 9(3) is so clear could explain the lack of case law dealing with this problem. In 
fact, the main authority in the area of computer-generated works predates the existing law. The 
case is Express Newspapers v Liverpool Daily Post,55 in which the plaintiffs published a 
competition involving the distribution of cards to its readers, with each card having a sequence 
of five letters that were to be checked against the winning sequences published by the Express 
group newspapers. The winning sequences were published in a grid of five rows and five 
columns of letters. Because the players did not need to purchase the newspaper in order to 
obtain the cards, the Liverpool Daily Post reproduced the winning sequences in their 
newspapers. The plaintiffs sued seeking an injunction against this practice.  
The defendants contended that the published sequences were not protected by copyright 
because they had been generated by a computer, and therefore there was no author.  Whitford 
J held that the computer was merely a tool that produced the sequences using the instructions 
of a programmer, so the plaintiffs were awarded the injunction. Whitford J commented:  
"The computer was no more than the tool […]. It is as unrealistic as it would 
be to suggest that, if you write your work with a pen, it is the pen which is 
the author of the work rather than the person who drives the pen."56 
This decision is consistent with s 9(3), but despite the apparent clarity of this argument, there 
is some ambiguity as to who the actual author is. Adrian astutely points out that Whitford J’s 
pen analogy could be used to adjudicate copyright ownership to the user of the program, and 
not to the programmer.57 It seems evident that the spirit of the law favours the later and not the 
former, but this is a persisting ambiguity that could have impact in a world where computer-
generated works become more prevalent.  
Let us use a word processor to illustrate why the existing ambiguity could prove problematic. 
It is evident that Microsoft, the makers of the Word programme, do not own every piece of 
work written with their software. Now imagine a similar argument with a more complex 
machine learning program such as No Man’s Sky. If we use the word processor analogy, one 
would own all new worlds generated by the software because the user made “the arrangements 
necessary for the creation of the work”. Yet clearly the game developers make a strong claim 
in their end-user licence agreement that they own all intellectual property arising from the 
game.58  
It is therefore necessary to seek clarification to this possible conundrum elsewhere. While 
discussing copyright reform that eventually led to the 1988 CDPA and the current wording of 
s9(3), the Whitford Committee had already discussed that “the author of the output can be none 
other than the person, or persons, who devised the instructions and originated the data used to 
control and condition a computer to produce a particular result."59  
Similarly, during the discussion of the enactment of the current law, the House of Lords 
discussed computer-generated in the context of exempting s 9(3) from the application of moral 
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rights.60 In that context, Lord Beaverbrook usefully commented that “[m]oral rights are closely 
concerned with the personal nature of creative effort, and the person by whom the arrangements 
necessary for the creation of a computer-generated work are undertaken will not himself have 
made any personal, creative effort.”61 This suggests that the law recognises that there is no 
creative input in computer-generated works, and therefore s 9(3) has been framed as an 
exception to the creativity and originality requirements for the subsistence of copyright. It is 
precisely this divorce with creativity what makes the UK’s computer-generated clause so 
different to other jurisdictions.   
Some commentators seem to be concerned about the ambiguity present both in the law and in 
Express Newspapers. Dorotheu goes through the options of who owns a work produced by an 
artificial intelligent agent, weighing the merits of giving ownership to the programmer, to the 
user, to the agent itself, or to no one at all.62 However, this apparent ambiguity could be solved 
simply by reading the letter of the law and applying it on a case by case basis. If the artificial 
agent is directly started by the programmer, and it creates a work of art, then the programmer 
is clearly the author in accordance to s 9(3) CDPA. However, if a user acquires a program 
capable of producing computer-generated works, and uses it to generate a new work, then 
ownership would go to the user.  
This is already happening with Deep Dream images. After announcing the existence of the 
Deep Dream project, Google released its code63 to the public as an open source program,64 not 
claiming ownership over any of the resulting art. Any user can run the program and generate 
art using it, and it would seem counterintuitive to believe that Google should own the images, 
after all, the user is the one who is making the necessary arrangements for the creation of the 
work.  
To illustrate this approach of looking at works on a case by case basis, we can look at the main 
case that cites s 9(3) CDPA. In Nova Productions v Mazooma Games,65 the plaintiff designed 
and sold arcade video games, and they claimed that the defendants produced two games that 
infringed its copyright. The question was not that any source code had been copied, but that 
some graphics and frames were very similar between all three works. In first instance Kitchin 
J found that there was no substantial similarity between the works, and the plaintiffs appealed. 
Jacob L J opined that individual frames shown on a screen when playing a computer game 
where computer-generated artistic works, and that the game’s programmer “is the person by 
whom the arrangements necessary for the creation of the works were undertaken and therefore 
is deemed to be the author by virtue of s.9(3).”66 Interestingly, Jacob L J also addresses the 
potential authorship of the user. He comments:  
“Before leaving this topic there is one further complexity I must consider 
and that is the effect of player input. The appearance of any particular screen 
depends to some extent on the way the game is being played. For example, 
when the rotary knob is turned the cue rotates around the cue ball. Similarly, 
the power of the shot is affected by the precise moment the player chooses to 
press the play button. The player is not, however, an author of any of the 
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artistic works created in the successive frame images. His input is not artistic 
in nature and he has contributed no skill or labour of an artistic kind. Nor 
has he undertaken any of the arrangements necessary for the creation of the 
frame images. All he has done is to play the game.”67  
This opens the door to the possibility that only a user who “contributes skill and labour of an 
artistic kind” could be declared the author of the work.   
To summarise, the situation in the UK with regards to computer-generated works would appear 
to be well covered by the law and case law, and even the potential ambiguities are not 
problematic. Generally speaking, s 9(3) acts as an exception to the originality requirements in 
copyright law. But there is a potential spanner in the works, European copyright law has been 
taking a very different direction with regards to originality, and this could prove to be a clash 
with regards to the long-term viability of the UK’s approach. This divergence is discussed next.     
3.2. Originality and creativity in Europe 
As it has been covered above, while the law is clear in the UK covering computer-generated 
works, the situation in the rest of Europe is considerably less favourable towards ownership of 
computer works. There is no equivalent to s 9(3) in the major continental copyright 
jurisdictions, and the subject is not covered by the international treaties and the copyright 
directives that harmonise the subject.68 Art 5 of Spanish copyright law69 specifically states that 
the author of a work is the natural person who creates it; while Art 7 of German copyright law70 
says that the “author is the creator of the work”, and while it does not specify that this is to be 
a person, Art 11 declares that copyright “protects the author in his intellectual and personal 
relationships to the work”, which strongly implies a necessary connection with personhood.  
The end result is that computer-generated works are not dealt with directly in most European 
legislation, so when presented with a work that has been created with a computer, one must 
revert to the basics of awarding copyright protection, namely originality. For such a vital 
concept of authorship, originality has proved to be a difficult concept to pin down, while it is 
well understood that originality is one of the most important elements of authorship, different 
jurisdictions have developed their own version of originality, and furthermore, the level of 
originality may vary in one jurisdiction depending on the nature of the work.71 Indicative of 
the lack of harmonisation is the fact that Rosati identifies at least four different originality 
standards in common use.72  
It is precisely the European standard that could present its own unique challenges to computer-
generated works. This standard is to be found in the Court of Justice decision of Infopaq,73 
where the Danish news clipping service Infopaq International was taken to court by the Danish 
newspaper association over its reproduction of news cuttings for sale to its clients. The clipping 
process involved a data capture process consisting of scanning images of original articles, the 
translation of those images into text, and the creation of an eleven-word snippet for sale to 
Infopaq’s clients. The court had to determine whether these snippets were original enough, as 
the process was highly mechanised. The Court decided to define originality as a work that must 
be the “author’s own intellectual creation”, and ruled in favour of giving copyright to the work.  
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Dealing specifically with computer-generated works there is further clarification in 
Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace,74 the CJEU were asked to determine whether a computer 
graphical interface was a work in accordance to the definitions set out in European copyright 
law.75 The court declared that “a graphic user interface can, as a work, be protected by 
copyright if it is its author’s own intellectual creation.”76  
The above make a strong indication about the personal nature of the European originality 
requirement. As Handig accurately points out, “[t]he expression “author's own intellectual 
creation” clarifies that a human author is necessary for a copyright work”.77 Moreover, the 
preamble of the Copyright Term Directive78 defines original as a work that is the “author’s 
own intellectual creation reflecting his personality”. It seems then inescapable to conclude that 
not only does the author need to be human, the copyright work must reflect the author’s 
personality.  
All of the above is not problematic for most computer-generated works, particularly those in 
which the result is the product of the author’s input. When using graphic editing software to 
produce a picture, the resulting picture will reflect the creative impulses of artists, reflecting 
their personality. But conversely, it is easy to see how a definition of authorship that is 
completely embedded to personal creativity would spell trouble for computer-generated works 
that are the result of an advanced artificial intelligence program. Even the creators of Deep 
Dream do not know exactly what happens at all stages of the production of an image. They 
comment that the artificial intelligence is perfectly capable of making its own decisions about 
what elements to enhance, and this decision is entirely independent of human input.79   
The decision of whether a machine-generated image will have copyright in Europe under the 
Infopaq standard may come down to a matter of a case-by-case analysis of just how much input 
comes from the programmer, and how much from the machine. Take the machine learning 
algorithm used in the creation of The Next Rembrandt as an illustration of the challenges ahead. 
The description80 of the process that led to the creation of the painting makes it clear that a lot 
of work was performed by the team of experts and programmers: they identified portraits as 
the way to go, and then selected using various commonalities in this set, including age, gender, 
face direction, and lighting. They then decided that the portrait would depict a “Caucasian 
male, with facial hair, between 30-40 years old, wearing dark clothing with a collar, wearing a 
hat and facing to the right”.81 With that data selection, they extracted data from portraits that 
had only those sets of features. The experts allowed an algorithm to select common features in 
the data set, and the program came with “typical” Rembrandt elements for each part of the 
portrait.  
The question then is whether The Next Rembrandt has copyright. Based on just the description 
of the process found in interviews and online, it is difficult to say that the process does not 
represent the personality of the authors through the choice of portrait elements to give to the 
computer to analyse. This is extremely important in the Infopaq standard, in that case the CJEU 
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commented that elements by themselves may not have originality, but a selection process could 
warrant originality. The Court ruled: 
“Regarding the elements of such works covered by the protection, it should 
be observed that they consist of words which, considered in isolation, are 
not as such an intellectual creation of the author who employs them. It is 
only through the choice, sequence and combination of those words that the 
author may express his creativity in an original manner and achieve a result 
which is an intellectual creation.”82  
Infopaq dealt with words, but the CJEU has extended a similar analysis to other types of work, 
such as it did with photographs in Painer v Standard Verlags,83 where the preparation phase of 
taking a photograph, as well as the development choices and even the software editing 
decisions would be enough to warrant originality as they would reflect the author’s “personality 
and expressing his free and creative choices in the production of that photograph.”84 
At the very least, The Next Rembrandt displays enough of that selection process to warrant 
originality given the current standards. But it is possible that other pictures where most of the 
decision is made by the computer, particularly in neural networks such as Deep Dream, this 
selection may not be enough to warrant originality, but this is entirely dependent on each case, 
and the interpretation given to what constitutes selection.  
UK works appear immune from these problems given the relative clarity of s 9(3), but this 
could be under threat given recent decisions, particularly the landmark case of Temple Island 
Collections v New English Teas.85 The case involves a black and white image of the UK 
Parliament building, and a bright red bus travelling across Westminster Bridge. The claimant 
owned the photograph, which was used in London souvenirs, and the defendant is a tea 
company that created a similar picture for a publicity campaign. Birss QC had to determine 
whether the original picture had copyright, and he concluded that when it comes to 
photography the composition is important, namely the angle of shot, the field of view, and the 
bringing together of different elements at the right place and the right time are enough to prove 
skill and labour, and therefore should have copyright.86 This result was consistent with the skill 
and labour originality standard that was prevalent in the UK through various cases.87  
However, throughout Temple Island Collections Birss QC seamlessly integrates “skill and 
labour” with Infopaq’s “intellectual creative effort”, and through repetition makes them 
equivalent, and even becoming “skill and labour/intellectual creation”.88 This case, coupled 
with other developments such as the treatment of originality in databases in the CJEU decision 
of Football Dataco v Yahoo! UK,89 has prompted Rahmatian to claim that the skill and labour 
test is under fire.90 It is now possible to contend that Infopaq has been harmonised into UK 
law.   
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If we take as a given that the UK now has a more personal test that requires us to analyse the 
author’s own intellectual creation reflecting his personality, then we could argue that artificial 
intelligence works where the author has less input could be under fire in the future, particularly 
if we can expect further harmonisation, which is difficult to ascertain given the troubled 
interaction with the EU at the time of writing.   
Assuming that nothing changes and s 9(3) remains the undisputed standard for computer-
generated works, it is now time to look at how other jurisdiction deal with artificial intelligence 
and computer generated works.  
3.3 Protection in other jurisdictions 
As we have seen above, there are several common law countries that have implemented some 
form of protection for computer-generated works, while continental traditions of copyright 
protection tend to place the emphasis of authorship on personality and the creative effort. There 
is a third group of countries that deal with authorship in ways that make it difficult to protect 
computer-generated works, and these are Australia and the United States.  
3.3.1 United States 
United States copyright has been dealing with originality and authorship in a manner that 
deviates from other jurisdictions, what Gervais and Judge call “silos of originality”91 where 
various approaches have arisen. The US standard is set by Feist Publications v. Rural 
Telephone Service,92 where the US Supreme Court had to decide on the originality of a phone 
directory containing names, towns and telephone listings. Feist Publications copied over four 
thousand entries from a “white pages” directory compiled by Rural Telephone Service, and 
they did so without a licence. The prevalent principle before this decision was a “sweat of the 
brow” approach that allowed the copyright of a compilation of facts if enough effort had gone 
into the creation of the compilation, even if facts are not protected by copyright.93 The Court 
famously commented that “100 uncopyrightable facts do not magically change their status 
when gathered together in one place”.94 Copyright protection therefore will only be given to 
“those components of a work that are original to the author”, 95 giving rise to a standard that 
requires “a modicum of creativity”.96 This test stands in stark contrast to the Inofopaq standard 
prevalent in Europe, as in Feist the Supreme Court clearly reckons that selection, coordination 
and arrangement of information is not an act that conveys originality, while the opposite is true 
across the Atlantic.97  
It is easy to see that under this standard, some computer-generated works would not be 
protected, particularly if we are witnessing a work created with advanced artificial intelligence 
where a human author may not lend originality to the work. In fact, Feist specifically seems to 
veer against granting “mechanical or routine” acts with originality,98 and can there be anything 
more mechanical than a machine that produces a work?  
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Before Feist, the main treatment of the subject was undertaken in the 1979 report by the US 
Congress National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works 
(CONTU),99 which decided not to give any special treatment to computer-generated works 
because no insurmountable problems were apparent or foreseeable. Because this was pre-Feist, 
CONTU’s approach was to allocate copyright protection for computer-generated works using 
the ‘sweat of the brow’ approach, which seemed sensible at the time, something that several 
commentators agreed with.100   
Other analysts were not as content with the CONTU approach, and veered towards a more 
proactive way to protect artificial intelligence works.  In an article well ahead of its time,101 
Butler opined that “[i]n the vast majority of programming situations the legal requirements of 
human authorship can be easily satisfied.”102 However, he conceded that there could be a 
problem with advances in artificial intelligence that would cross what he defined as the 
man/machine threshold;103 this is when a work can be said to have been authored by a machine 
and not by the programmer. Butler then goes on to suggest that copyright law pertaining to 
authorship should be interpreted with a “human presumption”,104 if a work has been created by 
a machine in a way in which the end result is indistinguishable to that produced by a human 
author, then it should receive copyright protection nonetheless. This is an elegant solution, one 
that incorporates the concept of the Turing test105 into law, making the standard of legal 
authorship one that would make the assumption that the author is human regardless of the 
process that gave rise to it. While it is tempting advocate for such a test, this would 
unfortunately incorporate a qualitative test to copyright that it currently lacks. Judges would 
have to be asked whether a text, a song or a painting are the product of a human or a machine. 
Any observer of modern art will understand why this may not be such a good idea, and it is 
easy to imagine judges getting it wrong more often than not.   
Therefore, it is perhaps fortunate that Butler’s Turing test copyright idea did not survive past 
Feist. For the most part, U.S. copyright law took a direction in which databases and 
compilations were left unprotected,106 while having a high standard of originality for other 
works.107 Most computer-generated creations that were deemed mechanical were not thought 
worthy of protection, while works in which the human component was clearly original were 
copyrightable, and with few exceptions108 there was little debate as to whether computer-
generated copyright would be a problem. In fact, in a review of the status of the law regarding 
artificial intelligence works post-Feist, Miller commented that while “neural networks raise a 
number of interesting theoretical issues, they are not yet in a very advanced stage of 
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development.”109 Perhaps accurately at the time, Miller advocated not to rush to any changes 
in the law until real cases emerged, and it seems like this “wait and see” strategy was to prevail.   
This all has changed in recent years with the advances in artificial intelligence depicted above. 
With machines set to make more and more creative decisions, the question about the copyright 
status of those works has resurfaced. If one believes that computer-generated works are worthy 
of protection, then the challenge is to get past the seemingly insurmountable obstacle that is 
Feist. Bridy rises to the challenge by recognising that there are not yet any cases dealing with 
“procedurally generated artworks”,110 so she uncovers a number of cases of non-human 
authorship. This is a very interesting avenue to explore, if we can find cases where copyright 
has been granted despite the lack of a human author, then this could boost the case for artificial 
intelligent ones. Some of these cases involve claims of authorship by non-human entities, be it 
aliens,111 celestial beings,112 or spiritual guides,113 which have been dictated to human authors. 
The common element in all of these cases has been that the courts gave copyright ownership 
to the human author, as they found “a sufficient nexus to human creativity to sustain 
copyright”.114 Bridy astutely comments that these cases could be used to justify copyright in 
procedurally generated artworks, as the possible automated element can be ignored and 
originality, if any exists, would be given to the author. This would be entirely consistent with 
the way in which the UK deals with computer-generated works.  
However, the U.S. Copyright Office has recently made a categorical statement that makes it 
difficult to interpret in favour of the existence of non-human authors. The U.S. has a voluntary 
system of registration, and while this formality is not a prerequisite for the subsistence of 
copyright, it is necessary in order to enforce rights.115 In the latest guidelines for   registration, 
the Copyright Office clearly declares that it “will register an original work of authorship, 
provided that the work was created by a human being.”116 They base this specially on the U.S. 
Supreme Court decision in Trademark Cases,117 which defines copyright as protecting fruits 
of intellectual labour that “are founded in the creative powers of the mind.”118 Nonetheless, 
one could interpret that this declaration is worded in a manner that could still allow some 
computer-generated content if there is enough human input into it. Similarly, it must be pointed 
out that this is not law, this is just a compendium of practices at the offices, and that these could 
be changed or re-drafted in future editions.    
Interestingly, other commentators appear to be moving towards a more European method of 
authorship that emphasises the author’s creative intent. Boyden in particular comments that 
emergent works could be given copyright by requiring a claimant to prove human authorship 
by establishing that the output “foreseeably includes a meaning or message that the author 
wishes to convey”.119 This formulation sounds remarkably like the current standard of 
originality that reflects the personality of the author.  
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On the other hand, other commentators do not see a problem with the current situation, at least 
not yet. Grimmelman makes a compelling case that there is no such thing as an artificial 
intelligent author, as most of the current examples are a mirage, and that talk of authorship has 
been fuelled by the “novelty and strangeness” of some computer programs.120  
Nonetheless, Grimmelman’s more sceptical take on computer-generated works appears to be 
in the minority at the moment, although it is true that we still do not have case law reviewing 
ownership in the United States. However, it may be only time before a copyright infringement 
case is defended with the argument that the work has no copyright because it was produced by 
an artificial intelligent machine.  
3.3.2 Australia 
Australia presents an interesting contrast with regards to protection of computer-generated 
works because it lacks the wording of s 9(3) CDPA that has been adopted by other countries 
such as New Zealand and Ireland.121 The requirement for authorship is strictly tied to the 
existence of a person,122 which could leave out works made by computers, a fact that had 
already been identified by the Australian Copyright Law Review Committee in 1998 as 
potentially problematic.123 As a result of this lack of protection, there is now case law in 
Australia where works that might have been protected in jurisdictions such as the UK have 
been declared as not covered by copyright because of lack of human authorship.124  
Although at some point there were some concerns that the Feist standard from the US would 
be exported around the world,125 it is difficult to find a country that has had a similar approach 
to originality, although countries such as Australia have been grappling with the question.  
This is evident in the case law that has been dealing with databases.126 A very indicative case 
showing the contrasting take on originality in Australia can be found in Desktop Marketing 
Systems v Telstra Corporation.127 The facts are somewhat reminiscent of Feist, where Desktop 
Marketing Systems produced a CD version of the phone directories belonging to Telstra, who 
claimed that such action infringed their copyright. In first instance128 the judge decided that the 
phone directories had copyright and therefore the respondent had infringed copyright. The case 
was appealed, and the Federal Court decided that the phone directories indeed have copyright 
even if they were a compilation of data. The Court directly addresses the Feist claim that a 
compilation of data cannot have copyright by declaring that the “task of carefully identifying 
and listing units”129 can be useful, and therefore could carry copyright protection.  
So, Desktop Marketing Systems diverged from the strict Feist standard, opening the door to the 
protection of compilations, and therefore allowing a less restrictive approach to originality. 
However, this case was reversed in IceTV v Nine Network Australia,130 where a provider of a 
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subscription-based electronic programme guide via the Internet would gather TV schedule data 
from the broadcaster Nine Network and offer it to its subscribers. While part of the judgement 
relied on whether the copying of the schedule had been substantial, the relevant issue to the 
present article was whether TV schedules have originality. In this, IceTV resembles Fesit more, 
as the High Court decided that there was not enough skill and labour in the expression of time 
and title required to create a program, on the contrary, it was minimal.131 A similar result can 
be found in the more recent case of Telstra Corporation v Phone Directories Company,132 
where the judge goes as far as to declare that phone directories involved in the litigation were 
not original because the authors of these works had not exercised “independent intellectual 
effort”.133  
By choosing a narrower interpretation of originality, IceTV and Telstra Corporation show us 
that a higher threshold of originality can have negative effects with regards to the protection 
given to computer-generated works. This is evident in the case of Acohs v Ucorp,134 where the 
claimant sued the respondent for copyright infringement of the source code of one of its 
programmes. Acohs and Ucorp are both in the business of developing software used to 
automatically fill industrial health and safety forms, which can be a time consuming endeavour, 
particularly in large enterprises. Both developers have different ways of producing and filling 
the forms, the Acohs system in particular does not store documents, it rather stores information 
in a database and then when requested by the user, the software pulls that data and creates the 
requisite form. In other words, the Acohs system procedurally creates a new document 
automatically upon request. Ucorp is accused of reproducing the resulting document by 
extracting HTML code from the documents, as well as layout, presentation and appearance of 
the outputs.135      
In a baffling decision, the judge ruled that the resulting output did not have copyright protection 
because the source code had been generated by the system, and as such it had no “single human 
author”.136 By being generated by a computer program, its originality was compromised and it 
could not have copyright. Going back to the arguments of whether the author of a computer-
generated work is the programmer or the user, Jessup J argued that those who initiated the 
program to generate code were not computer programmers, rather they were just using the 
software, and therefore they could not be authors.137 The case was appealed, but the result was 
the same as the Federal Court decided that the code had not emanated from human authors, 
and therefore it “was not an original work in the copyright sense.”138 
This decision bodes ill for computer-generated works in general, and for artificial intelligence 
in particular. Reading the facts of the case, it is evident that the Acohs system is in no way a 
complex machine learning mechanism, it is a rather basic use of databases to produce 
documents and source code. It is remarkable that a court would not consider this function to be 
worthy of copyright protection, and it shows precisely what a decision based on narrow 
understanding of originality that is on display in cases such as Feist, IceTV and Telstra 
Corporation can produce negative results. If a system such as Acohs does not have a chance 
to be declared original, what chance do more complex artificial intelligence systems have?  
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4. Making the case for harmonisation 
For a system of protection that is supposed to be harmonised at an international level in order 
to promise predictability and ease of conducting business,139 it is remarkable that the concept 
of originality, one of the most basic elements of authorship, is in such a state of disharmony. 
While the European standard of “the author’s own intellectual creation” has now been 
seamlessly incorporated to the UK standard of skill and labour, the higher threshold in 
countries like the United States and Australia are still irreconcilable with the prevailing 
European approach. It is difficult to imagine an equivalent to Temple Island Collections 
bringing together such disparate standards as Infopaq, IceTV, and Feist.  
It is clear that the various attitudes towards originality in computer-generated works 
highlighted above represent even more of a challenge. While originality may have been 
harmonised in Europe to a certain extent, it is impossible to foresee a case that would bring 
together Infopaq and s 9(3) CDPA. On the contrary, it would be possible to imagine a case that 
would try to declare the computer-generated work clause in UK as contrary to European law.  
While the concern of those who believe that there is no need to make changes to the law should 
be taken into account, Acohs shows us a future in which artificial intelligence works are not 
given copyright protection due to strict interpretation of what constitutes an original work. The 
requirement of having a human make all of the important creative decisions could have 
significant economic effect in the future.  
Besides computer code, there is one area where the effect of not giving protection to emergent 
works could have a serious commercial effect, and this is in the area of databases. It is no 
coincidence that some of the most important originality cases explored in the previous sections 
relate to data collection and compilation in one way or another.140 At the heart of the problem 
with data collections is the fact that courts have to decide whether the often mechanical 
selection and gathering of data constitutes an original work worthy of copyright protection.141 
Why is this relevant to the subject of computer-generated works? Because machine learning 
algorithms are already widely deployed in some of the most popular websites in the world.  
One of the most famous machine learning systems in the world is Amazon’s famous 
recommendation system, known as Deep Scalable Sparse Tensor Network Engine (DSSTNE, 
pronounced ‘destiny’). This system populates Amazon’s pages with unique recommendations 
for visitors based on previous purchases, and now it has been made available to the public 
under an open source licence,142 which could lead to a much wider adoption of machine 
learning techniques, and also increase the potential for a copyright suit arising from the 
authorship of machine-made webpages. Netflix is another company that relies considerably on 
intelligent recommendation systems to populate film listings tailored for each user.143    
These systems have human input in the sense that they were programmed by humans, but each 
unique work, namely the page displaying recommendations and listings, is created 
procedurally. Based on the current state of the law, these pages only have copyright 
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unequivocally in the UK. While companies such as Amazon and Netlfix may not be too 
bothered about possible infringement, the future users of DSSTNE and other similar machine 
learning systems that generate listings may be more concerned about copying from 
competitors.  
So there is certainly scope for harmonisation. It is the contention of the present work that the 
best system available at the moment is the computer-generated work clause contained in s 9(3) 
CDPA. This has several advantages: it would bring certainty to an uncertain legal area; it has 
already been implemented internationally in various countries; it is ambiguous enough to 
deflect the user/programmer dichotomy question and make it analysed on a case-by-case basis; 
and it has been in existence for a relatively long time without much incident.  
Moreover, a standard that allocates authorship to the person who made the necessary 
arrangements for a work to be made is consistent with existing law and case law. There is no 
need to change originality standards as such, we would only be creating an addendum that 
applies to works made by a computer.  
5. Conclusion 
At the end of the film Blade Runner, Roy Batty, an artificial entity (called replicant in the 
movie), makes an impassioned speech before his death: 
“I've seen things you people wouldn't believe. Attack ships on fire off the 
shoulder of Orion. I watched C-beams glitter in the dark near the 
Tannhäuser Gate. All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in the 
rain. Time to die.”  
While the film had characterised Batty as an inhuman killing machine intent on revenge, the 
final scene serves to display his humanity. An important element of the film’s plot is that some 
replicants do not know that they are not human, implying that the distinction between self-
aware machines that think they are human, and real humans, is inexistent. 
We are not at that stage yet, but we are certainly approaching a situation in which it will be 
difficult to discern if a song, a piece of poetry, or a painting, are made by a human or a machine. 
The monumental advances in computing, and the sheer amount of computational power 
available is making the distinction moot.  
So we will have to make a decision as to what type of protection, if any, we should give to 
emergent works that have been created by intelligent algorithms with little or no human 
intervention. While the law in some jurisdictions does not grant such works with copyright 
status, countries like New Zealand, Ireland, South Africa and the UK have decided to give 
copyright to the person who made possible the creation of procedural automated works.  
 This article proposes that it is precisely the model of protection based on the UK’s own 
computer generated work clause contained in s 9(3) CDPA that should be adopted more widely. 
The alternative is not to give protection to works that may merit it. Although we have been 
moving away from originality standards that reward skill, labour and effort, perhaps we can 
establish an exception to that trend when it comes to the fruits of sophisticated artificial 
intelligence. The alternative seems contrary to the justifications of why we protect creative 
works in the first place.  
